

Displacement: Microfoundations and Macro-Implications*

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Abstract

The paper identifies and offers an explanation of macro-level variation based on the microfoundations of displacement. The forms are explained based on the type of a cleavage in a conflict, and the perpetrator of violence. The cleavage type shapes individuals' likelihood of displacement, but also their best strategy for seeking safety. The perpetrator shapes the best options for the displaced to resettle. In conflicts that feature a cleavage that is relevant across regions (i.e., a high level of relevant "loyalty" aggregation) and in states with developed administrative capacities, segregation is the likely outcome; in similar conflicts in less developed states, expulsion of groups to the periphery or across borders is more likely. Within conflicts that feature a less easily defined cleavage across regions, and in states with a strong administrative presence, integration is most likely; where the administrative reach is weak, dispersion is. Each type of displacement featured has distinct and important implications for both state-building and humanitarian intervention.

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1 Introduction

On the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, humanitarian organizations anticipated thousands of refugees and constructed camps along the Syrian border to attend to their needs (Margesson, Bruno and Sharp, 2009, 7). But after the war started, a strange thing happened: hardly anyone came. In fact, families who had been forcibly relocated under Hussein’s regime began seeking ways to return to their original communities. While there were thousands of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), the next two years passed in much the same way: with a surprisingly low level of displacement. Then the mosque in Samarra was bombed in February 2006, and everything changed. Displacement tripled within months. Yet even though the violence was vicious and sectarian, roughly 75% of the displaced remained within Iraq. What can explain these patterns? Why was displacement so low for so long? And once it increased, why did the victims remain in Iraq? In spite of a huge literature on displacement, systematic answers to these questions are elusive. In this paper, I derive macro-level implications from microfoundations of displacement and their interaction with meso-level factors.

At the individual or household level, there are as many reasons for leaving one’s home and land during war as there are people.¹ Motivations can be grouped into overarching types, however. Indeed, a substantial segment of the literature on displacement dwells on the conceptual distinction between “forced” or “impelled” and relatively “voluntary” migration during war. Empirically, it is ambitious to establish what portion of an individual’s ultimate decision was “voluntary” or “forced” (Petersen, 1958). The problem is probably not just tricky but intractable. (Perhaps even epistemologically so).² Nonetheless, many studies have

¹I consider households the “micro” level as well, and treat them as comparable to individuals for now, even though men and women face systematically different types of threats, and respond differently to them (Meertens, 2001).

²For this reason, displacement in this paper will refer to wartime migration.

documented the myriad reasons people give for leaving their homes (e.g., Ibáñez, 2008). The complexity, contexts, and subjectivity these studies reveal suggest that displacement is a phenomenon that is the aggregate of innumerable personal experiences. This is certainly true on some level - but the aggregate of such suffering has broader implications as well.

Displacement is also a massive wartime phenomenon, with effects independent of the millions of people who comprise it. It is a predominant feature of civil war violence, victimizing orders of magnitude more people than lethal violence since WWII (Birkeland and Jennings, 2011). Some scholars have linked refugee movements to the spread of civil war; others have illustrated its role in international relations (Greenhill, 2010; Lischer, 2005; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006).

Yet the two perspectives - the micro- and the macro-level - interact in an unproductive way. The problem is that a focus on individual-level decisions leads to an aggregation of myriad decisions - and the only macro-level implication is the amount of people displaced.³ This focus may be useful for humanitarian intervention purposes, but it obscures important patterns in terms of type.

In this paper, I extend micro- and meso-level logic of displacement to capture and explain macro-level variation. In other words, I attempt to synthesize both micro-level behavior in the context of war, and the patterns that emerge at the macro level. Rather than focus on individuals' decisions, I consider the constraints that they confront, and more specifically the actors that shape these constraints: armed groups. We might think of these groups as the "meso" level. I argue that armed group behavior, in turn, is shaped by a meso-level attribute: the groups that civilians are associated with. Elsewhere I argue that armed groups expel civilians perceived to be disloyal in their effort to establish territorial control (Steele,

³An important exception is Lubkemann (2008), who highlights regional-level variation in patterns and individual- and household-level experiences in Mozambique.

2011). Loyalties play an important role in determining which communities are targeted by armed groups, and which people within those communities are targeted for displacement. Because information is scarce in civil wars, armed groups use short-cuts to infer individuals' loyalties, which they link to the likelihood of compliance with them or defection to a rival. In turn, individuals perceived to be potentially disloyal face different risks and constraints than those who are not.⁴ Ultimately, they may choose to leave the community because they have been directly threatened; or they may leave because they are afraid; or they may leave because they would prefer to live in a more secure community where the likelihood that they will be targeted is lower. The precise motivation can vary, but I argue that armed groups create situations to prompt civilians to leave, and that targeting members of a group in this way - what I call collective targeting - will increase the probability that members of the targeted group leave, for whatever reason. How and where they resettle are the key aspects that produce important macro-level patterns.

This insight offers a basis for comparison and explanation across wars - one that moves beyond comparing the scale of displacement to considering the nature of displacement as well. I contend that loyalty is a factor in shaping both micro-level behavior and macro-level patterns - even if the basis for assessing loyalty is highly localized and difficult to observe. Such loyalties shape targeting by armed groups, and resettlement decisions by civilians. At the same time, the conditions under which loyalties play a role vary across wars and over time (sometimes within a single war, as I return to below).

These macro-level patterns are key for understanding the implications of displacement and war for contemporary state-building. "States make wars and wars

⁴In other words, "true" loyalties are not necessarily relevant; it is nevertheless a convenient term.

- massively - make migrants,” James Scott observes, extending Charles Tilly’s adage (Scott, 2009, 146). Indeed, contemporary wars have produced roughly 40 million displaced people - more than at any other time in history. Elsewhere, I offer a framework for *how* contemporary wars “make” migrants (Steele, 2010). In this paper, I complete the circle by exploring how wartime migrations, in turn, influence state formation, state building, and nation building.

This paper continues in the next section by presenting a framework for understanding the microfoundations of displacement in the context of civil wars. Section three offers an explanation of when and where we are likely to observe each type of displacement at the macro level, based on how aggregate relevant loyalties are within a war, and the perpetrator of the violence. In section four, I discuss implications of the patterns of displacement for contemporary state-building and state formation. Section five concludes.

2 Microfoundations: Targeting, Loyalties, and Perpetrators

Individuals’ decisions about leaving their homes and communities, and where to resettle if they do, underly important aggregate patterns of displacement. I argue that these decisions are shaped by how individuals, families, and communities are targeted during civil wars, and by who perpetrates the targeting.

2.1 Loyalties & Leaving

From civilians’ perspective, what matters most in the context of warfare is safety. I argue elsewhere (Steele, 2009) that rather than the level of violence, it is the type of violence that shapes civilians’ risk and response. I identify three types of

targeting by armed groups that underly observed violence against civilians: selective, indiscriminate, and collective (Steele, 2009).⁵ *Selective targeting* occurs when armed groups target specific individuals for their behavior or suspected behavior, such as collaborating with or defecting to a rival.⁶ *Indiscriminate targeting* is not related to any trait or behavior, so anyone is potentially a victim. *Collective targeting* is based on a group-level shared trait.

Civilians face the greatest risk when confronted with selective targeting. In general, selective targeting falls into two broad categories: political and private. The former tends to entail individuals and households targeted for failing to collaborate with an armed group, or for defecting to a rival. Private selective targeting is based on a denunciation by another civilian, for motives unrelated to supporting one armed group or another (Kalyvas, 2006). Those selectively targeted are the least likely to stay in a community relative to other targeted types, because their risk of suffering direct violence is the highest. Their loyalty may or may not have lead to their alleged or actual transgression.

In cases in which the targeting is indiscriminate, determining the best way to minimize the likelihood of suffering violence is not clear-cut. One option is to relocate temporarily until the fighting or violence has ended; another may be to stay, depending on the frequency of the attacks. If the threat of suffering “collateral damage” is high, households are likely to leave. Here loyalties are irrelevant.

⁵Importantly, the form of targeting does not imply the scale of the violence: each type can relate to many or few victims. In the case of collective targeting, the proportion of the population targeted depends on the group-level trait on which the targeting is based - it may encompass an entire community, or be limited to a narrow profile, such as profession. Conceptually disaggregating the scale of the violence from its targeting basis is necessary to avoid inferring targeting type from the number of victims observed.

⁶Kalyvas (2006) explains how selective violence is “jointly produced” by armed groups and civilians, who take advantage of violence available to settle private grievances. In this work, selective targeting includes both those based on political and private motives. The important factor is how well the civilian targeted can assess the likelihood of suffering violence.

Collective targeting occurs when armed groups target members or associates of a group. Armed groups (as well as civilians) use civilians' types to infer support for a rival. Type can be related to neighborhood, ethnicity, or other group-level identifier. In this case, loyalty - perceived or real - matters because of its effect on competition with a rival armed group: armed groups believe that loyalty to a rival reduces the likelihood of collaboration, and increases the likelihood of defection. Importantly, perceived loyalties also inform an anticipated effect on competition in the future. Armed groups use collective targeting to gain or consolidate territorial control within wars, and it is also consistent with overall aims in some wars. When a civilian is targeted because of a "type," I assume that she has a higher probability of experiencing violence than a civilian of a different type. For example, resident of neighborhood A is more likely to be targeted by armed group B than a resident of neighborhood B. Collective targeting is distinct from being caught in the crossfire of battling armed groups, targeted indiscriminately with all other civilians, or selectively targeted for not collaborating or for defecting.

Civilians who face collective targeting have different possibilities and constraints than those who face other forms of targeting. When targeted or collectively, households' risk assessments depend on the decisions of other civilians similarly targeted - if everyone stays, it reduces any one household's risk of suffering direct violence. However, given sustained violence directed at their group, it is likely that households will decide to leave, triggering others to follow suit.⁷ In other words, it is not necessarily a direct experience of violence that prompts departure. Darby provides an example from Northern Ireland: "(...) more families left their

⁷Elsewhere, I develop a theory for when and where armed groups are likely to employ collective targeting to displace strategically, and thereby to gain an advantage over a rival. When armed groups compete for control over a community, they seek to displace disloyal civilians because such displacement undermines the rival armed group's presence, and is more effective than killing or attempting to convert those who are disloyal. To eliminate non-supporters, armed groups need to be able to tell who is loyal and who is not. In non-ascriptive contexts, elections are one mechanism that can indicate loyalties (Steele, 2010).

homes, not because they had actually experienced violence, but from anticipation of trouble in the future; that is, not because individuals had been attacked or threatened, but because the community to which they belonged had itself become isolated and vulnerable” (Darby, 1990, 98).

These forms of targeting transcend civil war and warfare type.⁸ What varies - across and within wars - is the basis on which people are expelled from their land and communities. In other words, the groups relevant for collective targeting. How civilians react to collective targeting relates to whether or not the group is local or not, and the perpetrator of the targeting.

2.2 Loyalties, Perpetrators, and Resettling

By level of loyalty, I mean how far the relevant allegiances travel within, or in some cases, across, countries. In other words, whether or not the targeted group is specific to a locality: if group membership is easily shed when someone leaves their community, it is a location-based group. In contrast, in some wars, ascriptive ‘clues’ are used to infer loyalties by one or both armed groups, and civilians themselves. Members of ethnic or sectarian groups can become targets because of an assumed or expected loyalty to that group, which may be relevant across vast swaths of territories, or even international borders. Their membership in this group may be actively embraced or reluctantly assumed. However, in the context of a civil war, information short-cuts are useful to armed groups seeking territorial conquest, particularly when the cleavage has become the most salient (Bulutgil, 2009), and when no other cross-cutting cleavages exist (Bulutgil, 2011). “High-level groups” can also refer to non-ascriptive associations, such as political parties,

⁸Kalyvas (2005) proposes a typology of warfare based on the relative resources available to the parties at war: conventional, irregular, and symmetric non-conventional. Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) explain variation in type over time; I will explore the relationship between warfare type, war aims, and displacement patterns in a future iteration of this paper.

class, or ideology. Frequently, such associations are more difficult to shed than assumed, and their relevance typically extends beyond a community or region.

Local-level loyalties, on the other hand, may not be easily observed by outsiders. The perceived loyalties can be the product of generations-long rivalries, reinforced by or determinant in choosing sides in the broader war. Kalyvas (2006) illustrates that such “private,” local histories can play a role in selective, lethal violence. But they can also shape who opts to leave a community depending on the threat of competing armed groups; and/or which families are targeted for expulsion from the community. Such loyalties, it should be noted, are only likely to be relevant in “irregular” civil wars (Kalyvas, 2005). The reason is that irregular warfare involves civilians as actors in territorial competition between armed groups – and their perceived loyalties even at the local level can be important for winning control. In contrast, conventional wars and “symmetric non-conventional” wars do not rely on civilian participation as much. However, employing collective targeting based on more highly aggregated groups is a frequent practice in both types of wars, leading to displacement. (Balcells (2010) shows that the form of violence in conventional civil wars depends on the distribution of collective identities in communities, and provides evidence from the Spanish Civil War.)⁹

When loyalties do not travel far, it may be the reflection of weak armed groups, or armed groups dedicated to looting rather than establishing political control of a territory. In some cases, these wars exhibit temporary displacement - because loy-

⁹Another type of displacement is unrelated to loyalties; it is more of a byproduct of political disorder than a means or ends of the war itself. In some contexts, people are targeted for the value of their land, for illicit or licit use. It is difficult to quantify the proportion of displacement related to such practices, but examples abound. (People are also systematically dissuaded from claiming any other form of displacement, because it may complicate their identity as innocents.) In Colombia, african palm oil producers have been the main licit group implicated in land grabs. Coca growers and corridors for trafficking are also seemingly linked to displacement. This form of displacement relates to state-building in much the way Reno (1999) describes war lords and state capture in West Africa. In the licit economy, the state is captured. In the illicit, the state cannot regulate the market so it reinforces illegal groups’ ability to control territory. These factors influence state-building now differently than before (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010).

alties across broader areas generally require some political work by armed groups, those groups that do not rely on a pre-existing cleavage or attempt to create a new one may not care about territorial control, or loyalties that would enable them to establish it. As such, people can avoid danger by getting out of the way of violence, but can generally return to their homes once it has passed. In some cases, looting will ultimately prompt a more permanent relocation - but will not be as likely to yield large-scale patterns such as in the other cases.

Once a group has been targeted, civilians have to make a decision about how to achieve safety. If it's a high-level, the members of the group cannot easily escape the relevance of their loyalty or identity. This leads to clustering: where people can't hope to escape violence entirely, they seek to lower the odds they will suffer it. I argue that when loyalties are relevant over a large space - when the cleavage level is high - the displaced are likely to cluster together. This is because they cannot escape violence *only* by moving, as they may be able to when the loyalty is based on local-level cleavages. Rather, they have to confront an ongoing risk of violence, regardless of where they move. For this reason, each household has an incentive to resettle together. Clustering together reduces the likelihood that any particular household will suffer violence. However, the perverse outcome is that whereas any one particular household is better off with the group, the group itself is at greater danger. The idea is captured in Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*: "Safety?" The wife of Pablo said. "There is no such thing as safety. There are so many seeking safety here now that they make a great danger. In seeking safety now, you lose all."

If someone is targeted for a low-level cleavage, relocating to where that cleavage is no longer relevant is a feasible option. A safe destination will be one where the perpetrator does not have effective capacity or interest to pursue. This is the second key factor for explaining resettlement patterns, regardless of the level

of group targeted: the perpetrator. If the state or state-allied group targets a local-level group, members are likely to try to hide in a different region of the country where insurgents have control, or to cross an international border. If the perpetrator is not a state armed group, members of a group are likely to find a location controlled by the state. When the state targets an entire group based on their ethnic or political loyalties, they are likely to cluster beyond the reach of the state - to where its rivals have territorial control, to an uninhabited territory, or across an international border. However, when a non-state group targets such group members, they are likely to remain within the state, producing a pattern that resembles segregation.

The framework is summarized in Table 2.

Table 1: Macro-Patterns of Displacement

Loyalty Type	Perpetrator	
	State	Non-state
Identity	Expulsion	Segregation
Location	Integration	

Expulsion

When loyalties are relevant across a large territorial space at least part of which is not administered by a central governing body, members of the group are likely to 1) cluster together; and 2) relocate outside the reach of the central state.¹⁰ As such, they may remain within the original boundaries of the state, but beyond the reach of its institutions. They could form a strong basis for autonomy or separatist

¹⁰Though protected by international law, only a lucky, tiny proportion of persecuted groups secure amnesty abroad. For the rest, clustering abroad is as much a function of reliance and assistance as security when they are beyond the reach of the perpetrating actor. Unfortunately, resettlement abroad is not always a sufficient condition for security, as demonstrated by Rwandan forces in Eastern DRC.

demands. Regardless of whether or not they cross an international border, they are effectively expelled from the governed territory of the state. The state is either too weak or indifferent to push the group entirely across the border. Many others cross international borders; in the contemporary period, the most frequent destination is to refugee camps. It also reflects observations about the relationship between displacement and nation-state formation (Haddad, 2008; Zolberg, 1983).

Segregation

Segregation occurs when groups cluster together in cities and regions within a state, forming enclaves. The logic can be explained by households' best option for seeking safety, once violence becomes a threat in their communities. A household that decides to leave a community in response to collective targeting has three general destination options. It can 'hide' among other civilians similarly targeted, seek protection by moving to a stronghold of the armed group with which it is associated (accurately or not), or attempt to shed its perceived association by hiding alone (Steele, 2009). Yet individuals resettling in new communities can be identified, either based on the timing of their arrival and their region of origin, or in the case of a war featuring an ascriptive cleavage, based on their characteristics. As a result, this option is high risk - if they were discovered, the likelihood of suffering violence again would be high. As such, these individuals and households have incentives to join others similarly targeted in order to reduce the risk of violence *to their household*. For example, moving to a predominantly Shi'a neighborhood in Iraq, or a Pashtun region in Afghanistan, reduces the odds that a particular Shiite or Pashtun household will suffer direct violence as the result of collective targeting.¹¹ Either hiding among others or relocating to an

¹¹See Weidman and Salehyan (2013) for an analysis of segregation in Baghdad that reflects this dynamic.

armed group's stronghold will create clustering at the aggregate level. The higher the level of relevant cleavage in a conflict, the larger the enclaves should be that form.¹²

Dispersion

When loyalties do not travel far, it may be the reflection of weak armed groups, or armed groups dedicated to looting rather than establishing political control of a territory. When loyalties do not extend beyond local communities, or not far beyond them, it is unclear where people can go for refuge. In some cases, these wars exhibit temporary displacement - because loyalties across broader areas generally require some political work by armed groups, those groups that do not rely on a pre-existing cleavage or attempt to create a new one may not care about territorial control, or loyalties that would enable them to establish it. As such, people can avoid danger by getting out of the way of violence, but can generally return to their homes once it has passed. In some cases, looting will ultimately prompt a more permanent relocation - but will not be as likely to yield large-scale patterns such as in the other cases.

Integration

In some cases, loyalties do not extend past the communities where people live, or cannot be inferred by physical traits of group members. Here again, in a relatively developed country, the best or only option is to remain in the country. However, while people may cluster in small groups of similar people, loyalties do not necessarily shape their behavior in terms of interacting with out-group members in new communities.

¹²An alternative in wars without an ethnic or high-level cleavage is that displacement itself is a signal of loyalties - based on the timing and location of departure.

This framework provides insights into how displacement can influence state formation. In the next section, I examine how well this framework illuminates trends in displacement patterns, and their relationship to state-building, over time. Changes over time have conditioned these outcomes in important ways. In particular, humanitarian regime, fixed borders, and developed administrative capacity factor into the macro-level patterns.

3 The International Context of Resettlement Patterns

Expulsion necessarily implies an international dimension¹³; in turn, factors at the international level have shaped perpetrators' and civilians' behavior, as well as the type of groups targeted over time. In this section, I describe the international system's impact on displacement and resettlement, and in turn how refugee crises lead to new institutions and norms at the international level that, again, affected the frequency and interaction of the domestic factors. Finally, I explore how 20th century changes at the international and domestic levels lead to a new, crucial factor at the domestic level: the administrative penetration of nation states.

3.1 Nation States, Sovereignty, and Refugees

Between 4 and 9 million people were uprooted and crossed international borders between the World Wars. Another 20 million may have been similarly expelled from their communities, but remained within their country of origin (Haddad, 2008). Arendt observed that in addition to "birthright," "loyalties" figured promi-

¹³Indeed, changes in the international system are related to the emergence of massive expulsion as I explain below.

nently into the calculation in the interwar period (Arendt, 1948, 278). Of course expulsions existed long before then, especially targeting religious groups when that was a feature of the state's legitimacy (Zolberg, 1983). The end of WWI and demise of the Ottoman Empire saw 1.3 million Greeks "returned" to and 400,000 Turks expelled from Greece, over 300,000 Armenians scattered and 200,000 Bulgarians on the move (Hobsbawm, 1996, 51). Population exchange and transfer emerged from how the international community conceived of refugees: the problem was to create homogenous states, and transfers were the "internationally legitimate means to overcome the discrepancy" (Haddad, 2008, 120). The formation of nation states implied upheaval for millions who no longer belonged. Zolberg (1983) observes that categories of people become targeted most often during the shift from empires to nation states: "Minorities had existed before; but they had now been turned into political misfits" (28).¹⁴

Western and Eastern Europe disgorged millions more during WWII - roughly ten times as many as the interwar period. The "calamity" that Arendt (1948) documented contributed to the adoption of an international human rights framework. Individuals' rights were tied to a sovereign state and their citizenship in it, but when they became refugees, their rights evaporated. Arendt (1948, 296) writes that the situation emerged "not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no longer any 'uncivilized' spot on earth (...)" where the refugees could go.

New states had to confront the stateless population - and so, through the United Nations, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted, which created legal standing in the absence of citizenship and obligations for member states. A refugee is defined in the convention as anyone who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,

¹⁴See Haddad (2008) for a similar assessment.

membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country...”¹⁵ 1947-1970s repatriation hardly considered (Preston, 1999).¹⁶

3.2 The Cold War, Insurgency, and Resettlement

The Cold War, according to Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), lead to an increase in insurgencies. In turn, insurgencies changed the frequency of integration and segregation. Birthright and loyalty still factor into displacement during wars. In turn, states continue to be formed by the process. Civilians’ behavior *is* political (Kalyvas, 2006; Trinquier, 1964), and armed groups can and do behave in strategic ways towards them - including in terms of displacement. As loyalties mattered in the formation of the nation state, so too do they matter in the formation of the “counterinsurgent state” (Rich and Stubbs, 1997). However, they are no longer about who can be a citizen, and therefore enjoy rights, but rather how they behave as citizens. The disloyal forfeit the right to live on the periphery, but they have the opportunity to change their behavior and join the core. (Of course, in more easily-monitored communities and refugee camps.) Meanwhile, those who stay are loyal to the state and form a tacit contract with the counterinsurgents - they will comply in order to stay. In this way, the state penetrates its periphery.¹⁷

¹⁵The UN adopted the 1967 Protocol to extend the Convention beyond Europe, and WWII-related displacement.

¹⁶In 1992, just as another wave of nation-state wars erupted, UNHCR declared the 1990s the decade of repatriation (Preston, 1999). Repatriation - up to 12 million refugees returned to countries of origin during 1990s (Black and Koser, 1999, 3).

¹⁷Alternatively, in some cases, the majority of a community may prove too difficult to govern and as a result, may be entirely displaced, depopulating the area. Such communities may exist as a result of terrain (Koher, 2004).

While the nation state is usually not at stake, the rules of governance are. Here the role of loyalty is different, at least theoretically.

The 1977 Amendments to the Geneva Conventions prohibited the resettlement of civilians during wars.¹⁸ Rather than changing states' and armed groups' behavior, however, it changed how these groups depict the problem.¹⁹ Now states and armed groups alike have incentives to represent displacement as out of their control, and certainly not caused by them directly: rather than resettlement, it was "evacuation" in Turkey, it's "displacement" elsewhere. In addition, humanitarian and advocacy organizations also have incentives not to distinguish among civilians. Legally, it would complicate the category of "non-combatant." Practically, it would risk continued targeting or rejection in their receptor communities. If they were targeted, civilians themselves have strong incentives for concealing the underlying reason they left - especially if it was not based on identifiable traits.

3.3 State Development and Internal Displacement

Then the 1980s saw a push to remove the state from the economy to facilitate development, until the pendulum swung in favor of modified state regulation and a particular emphasis on decentralization (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010). In Colombia, for example, this process led to an intensification of the civil war, defying hopes that increased representation and participation would mitigate the underlying causes of

¹⁸A demonstration of the conflict between the human rights and sovereignty models is the international community's struggle to offer an aid and legal framework for displaced civilians who do not cross borders (Cohen and Deng, 1998*a,b*). Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were only recognized as a problematic category decades later - the UN essentially defines them identically to refugees, but separates them because they have not crossed an internationally recognised border (UNHCR, 2010).

¹⁹According to Branch (2008), it also provided an opportunity for the Ugandan government, which he argues relied on humanitarian intervention in order to carry out wide-scale displacement of Acholi civilians.

the conflict. Decentralization - as well as counterinsurgency and service-provision more broadly - is achieved in part by contracting with private organizations. Whether the state increases its own bureaucratic capacity, or sub-contracts service provision to outside actors, the assistance available to citizens has increased.

The administrative capacity of states changes the calculations of both perpetrators and civilians, because it changes the relationship between perceived loyalties and behavior. State perpetrators believe in such contexts that administrative capacity - translating to the ability to monitor civilians - makes loyalties irrelevant. Instead of allowing people to resettle on the periphery, states seek to administer it. Civilians require safety and assistance in the context of ongoing warfare, and in many cases are willing to acquiesce, or comply, in order to receive it.

Nation-state formation “requires destruction of old solidarities as well as the fostering of new ones” (37) but this is harder because of “underdevelopment” and this makes liberal strategies of resolution impossible; state builders resort to coercive means. This, in turn, leads to some groups being targeted (Zolberg, 1983, 37). In other words, the level of development - I argue that administrative penetration is the most relevant dimension - is itself endogenous to which groups are targeted, and indeed, to whether or not war erupts to begin with. Here I take it as exogenous.

3.4 Contemporary Wars: Loyalty, Assistance and Citizenship

“Administrative penetration” is a term inspired by James Scott. For Scott, there are roughly four periods: a stateless era, “an era of small-scale states encircled by vast and easily reached stateless peripheries, a period in which such peripheries

are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion of state power, and finally an era in which virtually the entire globe is an “administered space” and the periphery is not much more than a folkloric remnant” (Scott, 2009, 324). This has varied over time, and persists in varying across states in the contemporary world. It is relevant because it influences the destination options for civilians, and even the decisions of armed groups. The displaced seek security, but they also need assistance: they have lost most of their assets, suffered potential trauma, and typically must care for children. Assistance can be provided by the state itself, by social and kin networks, by strangers in new communities, or the international community. Where assistance emerges, and which are the best or at least most feasible to access, depends crucially on the level of administrative reach of the central state.

When a state has effectively penetrated its territory, there are two effects on civilians’ behavior. Their movement is more restricted because of border checks.²⁰ Such states also tend to be more urbanized than others, and cities offer one of two important possibilities: security by clustering with others who are similar, or anonymity. Counterintuitively, then, even in the context of an insurgency and counterinsurgency reaction, people living in such states are likely to seek refuge within the state itself, or have no other choice but to do so. Such is the case in Colombia, but also in Iraq, where the cleavage was much different. (I argue that this difference led to differences in resettlement within the states, which I return to in the next section.)

In states where a centralized power has little or no authority in the periphery (via functioning institutions), the patterns are likely to be distinct. The state may not have the administrative capacity or interest in providing assistance to

²⁰This can also be true if neighboring states are highly functioning.

the displaced (and it may depend on which actor displaced them).²¹In the border areas of such states, camps for the displaced and refugees can be established in the absence of a state presence. The displaced in these situations face two options: move to the capital city, or to a camp set up by the UN and run by an international aid agency.²²

Alternatively, civilians could change their preferences after an experience of displacement - they may resent their experience supporting an insurgent group only to suffer, or they may have had to comply with the armed group despite misgivings. Kocher finds surprising evidence that this was the case among “evacuated” Kurds in Turkey (Kocher, 2002).²³ It is most likely in conflicts and states that have additional cleavages available (Bulutgil, 2011). The possibility of managing the periphery through displacement is an important development.

These developments have led to the following, updated table:

Table 2: Macro-Patterns of Displacement

Loyalty Type	State Administrative Penetration	
	High	Low
Identity	Segregation	Expulsion
Location	Integration	Dispersion

²¹The state capacity argument has been effectively criticized by others - see Kocher (2010) and Staniland (2012), among others. A crucial problem is that capacity is endogenous to political incentives and interests. In other words, it is as much an outcome as an explanatory factor, which may also explain whatever capacity is meant to. Low administrative presence tends to coincide with several other characteristics, including the penetration of national identities (or nationalism), and a concomitant strong sense of who is a citizen - independent of a state’s ability (again, or interest) in establishing institutional presence throughout its territory. In this case, I will try to be careful to identify when and where some factors explain both displacement and resettlement and administrative presence.

²²The efficacy and security of these camps has been questioned by many (Lischer, 2005).

²³This raises the possibility that states anticipate such a change, and use displacement to disrupt the loyalties underlying the conflict.

4 Theoretical Implications: Displacement and State-building

If the argument is correct, what does it indicate about the relationship between war, state-building, and displacement?

Expulsion

Expulsion can lead to the creation of a radicalized periphery, as was the case in Colombia following the displacement of Liberals during *La Violencia*. Areas of resettlement can be more difficult to govern in the future because of armed or unarmed resistance to government encroachment. If groups are expelled across borders, it could lead to ongoing international conflict with neighbors.

Colombia's experience over the last 60 years has paralleled the general trend. During and following *La Violencia*, it was easier to allow the millions displaced to flee to unsettled territories. (Arendt's view that the world was "completely civilized" was rather Euro-centric, given the vast unsettled territories in the developing world at the time.) Rather than expel refugees to another state, they were expelled to the periphery. The armed groups that emerged from *La Violencia* also found refuge in these territories and over the years, developed strong ties to communities, some of which they helped create. When the state and its allies attempted to extend its sovereignty throughout its territory decades later, it encountered powerful armed groups, and the civilians who associated with them - the disloyal - could not be permitted to continue on the periphery. But half a century after the expulsions of the 20th century, these disloyal did not have to leave the country. Rather, they could be incorporated into a modern core, under democratic institutions - the same institutions, ironically, that enabled the

counterinsurgents to detect disloyalties on the periphery. As a result, displacement has gone in the opposite direction as decades earlier: from these peripheral communities back into the core.

Segregation

Segregation can have both wartime and peacetime impacts on politics. First, it can lead to polarization within the population, hardening cleavages and intensifying the conflict. In the case of Iraq, segregation even led to calls for partition of the country. Second, even if the groups are integrated into the state, rather than left on the periphery, it can create serious implications for the basis of future political organization, especially political party formation.

Integration

Finally, integration – perhaps the strangest outcome from the perspective of the displaced, and beneficial one from the perspective of the state. I argue that the displaced are likely to seek assistance from the state itself when the state has some administrative capacity to offer it. This should lead to the growth of cities, where most states have the most administrative density. While the strain of assistance demands can be difficult for a developing country to meet, it can also spur administrative innovation. Further, providing assistance can also allow a state to monitor its citizens, or in most cases, even create citizens in the sense that the displaced may have resided beyond the state's reach prior to their resettlement. In other words, the (perceived) disloyal forfeit the right to live on the periphery, but they have the opportunity to change their behavior and join the core. Meanwhile, those who stay on the periphery are loyal to the state and form a tacit contract with the state - they will comply in order to stay. In this

way, the state penetrates its periphery.²⁴

Integration can also be at the level of the community, rather than the state. Communities often struggle to incorporate newcomers if there are scarce resources and jobs. However, I do not expect such local-level conflicts to aggregate up to the state level in a straightforward way.

5 Conclusion

This paper has presented a new characterization of aggregate patterns of displacement in civil wars, which sheds light on the range of possible ways that displacement relates to state building. In addition, it has offered a link between individual-level constraints, armed group behavior, and aggregate patterns of displacement within and across wars. To the extent that the argument illuminates state building, it represents a contribution to the literature linking it with war. It is uncontroversial to observe that war and state building are connected; what is rather murky are the ways in which war relates to state building in the contemporary world. It seems fairly clear that West Europe's early modern experience is not a blueprint for current situations in other states.

The next steps include detailing the observable implications of the argument, and providing a rigorous empirical evaluation of both the characterization of displacement types, and the causal argument. This will entail coding past wars in terms of the explanatory factors presented here - the level of loyalty aggregation and extent of administrative presence in a state. Further, I will code each war for the displacement pattern it predominately exhibits. These types are ideal, and there will certainly be exceptions. But I think that they capture the essential

²⁴Alternatively, in some cases, the majority of a community may prove too difficult to govern and as a result, may be entirely displaced, depopulating the area. Such communities may exist as a result of terrain (?)

macro patterns of displacement, grounded in micro-foundations. They also require careful investigation - did Peru's war against the Shining Path feature high or low loyalty aggregation? Probably somewhere in between, given how it fell along those in the highlands with predominately indigenous heritage. Guatemala may be an unfortunately clearer case: the Maya were strongly associated by the government as pro-insurgent - resulting in the slaughtering of tens of thousands on the basis of their ethnic identity. (Some scholars call it genocidal, but others point out the counterinsurgent motives.) Even though the empirical and conceptual matching is tricky, the underlying logic, I think, is persuasive.

The form of displacement also suggests variation in terms of scale of overall displacement. The higher the level of loyalty aggregation, the higher the displacement is likely to be. The framework presented here offers the advantage of guiding policymakers to anticipate where people are likely to seek refuge, by focusing not on the level of violence but rather on how violence is targeted, and by assessing a state's administrative reach and existing settlement patterns. The camps set up in the deserts of Iraq make little sense in retrospect, but may have been better foreseen as well.

Arendt (1948) pointed out that the post-WWII refugee crisis was not a new phenomenon at the time: "(...) in the long memory of history, forced migrations of individuals or whole groups of people for political or economic reasons look like everyday occurrences" (293). In the mid-20th century, states determined who could be citizens: as Tilly (1992) put it, "Because those who control states define whole populations as their enemies, wars generate refugees at a huge rate" (203). Such "enemies," noted Arendt (1948), were defined by birthright or loyalties. The post-WWII refugees, though, shaped state formation as much as they were a product of them. Whether ethnic cleansing and population transfers were the product of territorial contestation (Bulutgil 2009), or attempts to craft the kind

of population states preferred to govern (Mann, 2005), groups were expelled in the process of state formation - and in turn, shaped the formation of states. Now, in a contemporary period defined by the tension between human rights and sovereignty,²⁵ the way that states at war create displaced populations, and the way that such wartime migrations in turn shape states, has changed.

On a deeper level, while displacement has always existed in some sense, my work indicates a contemporary transformation in the context of an international human rights framework and an age of democratization. Whereas states in the interwar period earned Arendt's ire for stripping citizenship from the disloyal, increasingly, the displaced remain within their states. (Refugees today account for less than half of all the displaced in the world.) As states expand their presence to their peripheries, loyal citizens are permitted to stay. However, troublesome and disloyal citizens relocate to where access to needed assistance is located. Conveniently, these areas are typically in the center.²⁶ There, the displaced can register with the state (in the case of Colombia), and even register to vote again in the future - perhaps ironically demanding that their needs be met through the very institutional mechanisms that endangered them to begin with. In this way, the disloyal from the periphery are incorporated into the center - and neutralized along the way.

²⁵A demonstration of the conflict between the human rights and sovereignty models is the international community's struggle to offer an aid and legal framework for displaced civilians who do not cross borders (Cohen and Deng, 1998*a,b*). Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were only recognized as a problematic category decades later - the UN essentially defines them identically to refugees, but separates them because they have not crossed an internationally recognised border (UNHCR, 2010).

²⁶Refugee camps are alternatives that similarly gather people and register them for easy monitoring.

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